Four Questions and One Conclusion Regarding Obama and Iran.

Four Questions and One Conclusion Regarding Obama and Iran.(IE).By Amos Gilboa.The discourse on the Iranian subject is saturated with clichés and slogans. In order to fathom the American policy, one needs to understand what lies behind them.

They tell that back at the time, there took place a dispute between the Prime Minister Golda Meir and the American Secretary of State in the 70s, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger would present her an argument for his position, and Golda would answer with a counter-argument. And then Kissinger would bring up another argument, and Golda would respond with a counter-argument. So this duel went on until all Golda’s arguments were refuted. At this moment she said: “But I believe that…” Before she completed the sentence, Kissinger intervened and said: “I give up because I’m unable to argue with beliefs.”*
I recalled this story in light of the words of faith voiced over here recently on the U.S. and Iran issue. 
Many are those who come and say: “I believe the Americans/I believe Obama” – including the President of the country. Those hearing it interpret that those who say so believe that ultimately, if Iran truly faces acquiring of the nuclear capacity, the United States will come with all its abilities and terminate the Iranian capability.
Some of the believers do not explain the source of their faith. Peres at least did: There was no American president who didn’t go to war beyond the borders of his country, and a nuke in Iran’s hands endangers the United States at the same measure as it endangers Israel.
In the spirit of Kissinger’s words, there is no place in strategic debate for expressions like “I believe” or “I don’t believe” – but instead, for assessments, likelihoods or probabilities, interests, world outlooks, circumstances and plenty of diverse considerations. In order to try and understand the American policy, I’m raising four questions.

1. The first question deals with General Dempsey, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. He obsessively repeats the statement that Israel doesn’t have an ability to eliminate the Iranian nuclear program. Well and good, and possibly, very accurate. But from the most senior American military personality, I expect to hear other things, such as what the American capabilities are or will America be able to eliminate the Iranian nuclear capacity by conventional forces?

2. The second question is related to the U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, and again to Dempsey. They keep saying that they don’t want to be a part of Israeli unilateral strike and warn that Israel will be left alone.
My opinion is that Israel must coordinate its steps with the United States as a supreme commandment, but I raise the question: If the words of the American top brass are true, isn’t it saying, in practice, the following thing to Iran and the whole world – “We don’t care what will happen to the State of Israel after the attack (although their President’s motto is that “the American commitment to Israel’s security is unwavering”)? Isn’t the U.S. willing to defend its own strategic interests in the region which could go into a tailspin after an Israeli attack?

3. The next question has to do with the well-worn cliché: “There’s still time for sanctions and diplomacy.” Which is a correct statement, however, the question arises: Why not all of the possible sanctions are employed? And until when there is time? If back at the time, Obama allotted one year to the permanent Israeli-Palestinian agreement, why the United States doesn’t set some general point of time now?

4. The last question is connected to even more worn cliché: “All the options are on the table.” OK, so what? Why doesn’t the United Sates issue something a little bit more clear and determined? Something that would be more concrete and at the same time, not binding in a way like tying the hands? Everyone can put together for himself the possible answers. 
When I put together my answers and analyze Obama’s worldviews and the current American interests, my conclusion, as of now, is: The chance that Obama will reconcile with a nuclear Iran is higher than the chance that he’ll act militarily for destroying its nuclear capability.

The author is Brigadier General (res.), adviser on intelligence affairs to the Israeli intelligence community and lecturer on intelligence. He has held several senior positions in the Intelligence Corps and in the Intelligence Department of the IDF General Staff, most recently as Head of the Research Division. He also served as Adviser to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs and as Adviser to the Defense Minister.
* The quote hasn’t been verified.