"Israel's STAUNCHEST ally" - Mr. Obama’s Peace Process and the Duality of Language.(JM).By Stephen M. Astrachan.President Obama has made the completion of an Israeli/Palestinian peace agreement a central goal of his foreign policy. Unfortunately, rather than making peace he has pushed the two sides even further apart. Tragically he may have squandered a remarkable opportunity to advance the cause of peace in this deeply rooted conflict.
Mr. Obama inherited a policy frame-work for resolution of the conflict dating back to President Clinton’s efforts at Camp David in Summer 2000. He implied this new policy with subtle language to a foreign audience in his June 2009 speech in Cairo: “The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.” 2
The ambiguous wording carried parallel messages. Superficially it seemed to reiterate our long-standing objection to new settlement construction. However, the language “continued Israeli settlements” rather than something like “continued settlement activity” implied that Jewish residence outside the pre- June 67 lines was unacceptable. The sequential use of “settlements”, “construction”, and “settlements” tended to obscure the true meaning of the statement. In all likelihood the Moslem audience, to whom these remarks were addressed, understood the underlying meaning.
Mr. Obama opened another dramatic area for Israel to concede. In March 2010 during a visit to Israel by Vice President Biden, the Jerusalem municipal authority announced the construction of new homes in a Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem. The announcement was an intentional embarrassment to both Mr. Biden and Mr. Netanyahu who made repeated public apologies. Mr. Obama, rather than simply accepting the apology and moving on, initiated a public confrontation with Israel. His anger was legitimate. The proximity talks, with Senator Mitchell moving between the two parties sitting 30 miles apart, had just begun and such an announcement could have compromised that effort. On the other hand Mr. Netanyahu’s apology was genuine and should have been accepted. Furthermore, the proximity talks themselves represented a substantial Israeli concession given her desire for direct negotiations. Somehow neither the ten month West Bank construction freeze nor the concession of indirect negotiations seemed to matter when Secretary of State Clinton in a harsh telephone conversation told Mr. Netanyahu that the United States wanted Israel to take “specific actions” indicating that “they are committed to this relationship and to the peace process.” 3
The subsequent televised public rebuke by David Axelrod was a further escalation in a diplomatic confrontation over a relatively minor incident. 4
The alternative of containing the fall out and focusing on the indirect negotiations was nowhere to be found.
Later that month Mr. Netanyahu traveled to Washington D.C. to heal the rift between himself and Mr. Obama. They met on March 23, 2010. By all accounts the meeting reflected Mr. Obama’s continued hostility. There were no pictures or public statements that would normally be part of a Presidential meeting with the leader of a friendly nation. By some accounts Mr. Obama went even further towards public humiliation by immediately giving Mr. Netanyahu a list of 13 demands and later leaving saying, "I'm going to the residential wing to have dinner with Michelle and the girls...I’m still around…Let me know if there is anything new." 5
This stance from the President of the United States gave permission for even greater hostility from others. It was at that time that that Turkey took the provocative step of supporting the extremely dubious Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) 6 in trying to run Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza.
More central to the peace process was the change in policy by the Palestinian Authority which took Mr. Obama’s public policies as their own and went further by making the cessation of new construction in the West Bank and in Jerusalem preconditions to further negotiations. Likely implicit here was the belief that the new American President would deliver Israeli compliance and thus preclude the necessity of serious negotiations. Mr. Abbas had negotiated with many previous Israeli governments and had never raised these issues as preconditions for negotiations. While many have commented on Mr. Obama’s role in this change, none have done so with greater authority than has Mr. Abbas himself.
In November 2010 Mr. Abbas posted a policy statement “I Reached Understandings with Olmert on Borders, Security.” The piece was generally a defense of his positions on various issues in contention with the Netanyahu government. However, it was quite clear on the origin of the construction halt policy, “Obama said in his (June 2009) Cairo (speech) that Israel must stop all (construction) activity in the settlements. Could we have (settled for) less than that? So we said Israel must stop all construction in the settlements…” 7 In April 2011 he continued this theme in his conversation with Newsweek reporter Paolo Verzone,”It was Obama who suggested a full settlement freeze…I said OK, I accept. We both went up the tree. After that, he came down with a ladder and he removed the ladder and said to me, jump. Three times he did it.” 8
Eventually Mr. Obama started to receive criticism for his seemingly disproportionate hostility towards Israel while Mr. Netanyahu was calling for direct negotiations and Mr. Abbas was establishing pre-conditions. Finally, in July 2010 President Obama forcefully called for the Palestinian Authority to return to direct negotiations in a strongly worded letter. 9
Later on September 24, 2010 in a United Nations address Mr. Obama spoke eloquently, "Those of us who are friends of Israel must understand that true security for the Jewish state requires an independent Palestine -- one that allows the Palestinian people to live with dignity and opportunity". And those of us who are friends of the Palestinians must understand that the rights of the Palestinian people will be won only through peaceful means -- including genuine reconciliation with a secure Israel.” “Those who long to see an independent Palestine must also stop trying to tear down Israel. After thousands of years, Jews and Arabs are not strangers in a strange land. After 60 years in the community of nations, Israel's existence must not be a subject for debate.” 10
Unfortunately beneath the soaring rhetoric lay the stark reality of an incoherent policy, “Israel's settlement moratorium has made a difference on the ground and improved the atmosphere for talks. And our position on this issue is well known. We believe that the moratorium should be extended.” “Now is the time for this opportunity to be seized, so that it does not slip away.” The settlement freeze had begun nearly a year earlier but Mr. Obama was only then acknowledging the opportunity that it created and urging that it be seized. He had run down the clock on the construction freeze having spent much of that time escalating a public confrontation with Israel that all but drove the Palestinian Authority to a set of preconditions that made the chance of real progress increasingly remote.
Mr. Obama’s approach to the conflict has been marked an almost obsessively critical view of Israel and Mr. Netanyahu and an almost complete inability to attribute fault to the Palestinian Authority. In April 2010 the Wall Street Journal in commenting on our efforts to encourage Mr. Abbas to resume negotiations quoted a U.S. official as saying, “The Palestinians have assurances that there would be consequences if the Israelis don’t live up to their side of the bargain.” 11 This statement, however striking, can be attributed to our diplomatic efforts to resume the indirect negotiations.
More recently there was the well publicized “off-microphone” gaff between Prime Minister Sarkozy and Mr. Obama in November 2011: Mr. Sarkozy, “I cannot bear Netanyahu, he's a liar. “Mr. Obama, “You’re fed up with him, but I have to deal with him even more often than you.”
14 This candid exchange occurred almost immediately after Mr. Netanyahu announced plans to begin the removal of some of the small Jewish outposts in the West Bank. In doing so he kept a promise made but never fulfilled by his two predecessors and incurred some political cost in the process. 15 Yet Mr. Obama’s comments reflected complete indifference to this important recent development.
Circumstances seemed hopeful for a new beginning between Mr. Obama, Mr. Netanyahu, and Mr. Abbas. But again, this was not to be. Only hours before the President’s speech Israel was informed of the new policy doctrine that Mr. Obama was about to announce.
Mr. Obama’s speech of May 19, 2011 was billed as a major policy address on the Arab Spring. However, he devoted about 20% of it to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. This was more than to any other single topic. 16 He fundamentally altered the U.S. posture toward the conflict.
The first policy concerned borders. “We believe the borders of Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both sides.” With this bold stroke Mr. Obama abandoned all previous policy from the diplomatic ambiguity of the 1967 UN Resolution 242 to Presidents Clinton’s and Bush’s recognition of demographic changes and generally defined land swaps. Beyond the obvious political difficulties this policy would create for any Israeli government, the term “1967 lines” raised national security concerns harkening back to the memories of the vulnerability that those lines posed in earlier years. Mr. Obama immediately compounded these concerns.
"As for security, every state has the right to self-defense, and Israel must be able to defend itself -– by itself -– against any threat. Provisions must also be robust enough to prevent a resurgence of terrorism, to stop the infiltration of weapons, and to provide effective border security. The full and phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces should be coordinated with the assumption of Palestinian security responsibility in a sovereign, non-militarized state. And the duration of this transition period must be agreed, and the effectiveness of security arrangements must be demonstrated."
The sheer duplicity of this statement was stunning. In plain language it called for a full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank and the complete reliance on the Palestinian security forces. Yet the substance of the policy, “full and phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces” is almost hidden in the center of the paragraph preceded and followed by a string of seeming assurances to Israel’s security that tend to obscure the statement’s actual meaning. Mr. Obama’s later references to this statement as an assurance of Israel’s security compunded the cold cynicism of his words.
The Palestinian Authority had not made the full reliance on their own security forces an important policy goal. In fact Mr. Abbas had openly spoken about accepting third party NATO forces as a basis of security.
17 To him the security force issue was one in which compromise seemed possible. Once again, Mr. Obama raised the bar on the Palestinian side beyond anything they had requested.
Nothing in my comments should be taken as critical of any outcome that might have resulted from the give and take of comprehensive direct negotiations between the two parties. However, it is in the likelihood of real negotiations that Mr. Obama did perhaps the greatest harm. He then insisted that the issues of borders and Israel’s security (as he defined it) be a first stage of negotiations preceding deliberation on the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees:
"These principles provide a foundation for negotiations. Palestinians should know the territorial outlines of their state; Israelis should know that their basic security concerns will be met. I’m aware that these steps alone will not resolve the conflict, because two wrenching and emotional issues will remain: the future of Jerusalem, and the fate of Palestinian refugees. But moving forward now on the basis of territory and security provides a foundation to resolve those two issues in a way that is just and fair, and that respects the rights and aspirations of both Israelis and Palestinians."
Thus Israel was to cede the final borders and agree to completely withdraw of its forces from the West Bank, i.e. give up its major bargaining chips before dealing with the contentious issues of Jerusalem and the Palestinian right of return. The fundamental notion of land for peace was abandoned. Israel was to give up land and then discuss peace.
We have two leaders, one Israeli and one Palestinian. Both have dedicated their lives and considerable talents to the national aspirations of their people. Yet each has seemingly tried to advance compromise positions with the other. Unfortunately, the President of the United States of America failed to seize a middle-ground where a true reconciliation might have occurred. Instead, he chose to impose his own policies which one side could not accept and the other not reject. We shall never know what might have been with different American leadership.
If Mr. Obama is re-elected this November he will most likely reemphasize, final borders based on pre-1967 lines with land swaps, full Israel Defense Force withdrawal from the West Bank, and negotiation on the status of Jerusalem and the Palestinian right of return only after these Israeli concessions are complete. His laudable emphasis on Israel’s military security and legitimacy must be understood in context of this larger policy. The difference will be that he will then conduct foreign policy without ever again having to stand before the electorate. For it is the President of the United States who determines our foreign policy under the Constitution, as it has been since the days of Chief Justice John Marshall.
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