Analysis: 'Brussels attacks a warning to plan for the worst' by Jasmine Opperman. (senior analyst for the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium TRAC). (
DM).
The Belgian attacks show that Islamic State is under pressure but
extremely flexible. The effectiveness of their sleeper cell model,
combined with excellent propaganda, means that all countries need to be
on high alert. And yes, that includes South Africa.
Early on 22 March 2016, co-ordinated explosions
rocked the Belgian capital of Brussels: two at Zaventem Airport and
another at a metro station in the centre of the city, near European
Union buildings. So far, about 34 people have died, and more than 100
have been reported injured. Islamic State (IS) has claimed
responsibility for the attacks.
It's
tempting to see these attacks as merely a knee-jerk response from the
Islamist group to the arrest last week of Salah Abdelslam, one of the
November 2015 Paris attackers who had been on the run since then.
There's a lot more going on than that, however.
Under
interrogation, Abdeslam admitted to Belgian police that he was “ready
to do something in Brussels”. After finding many weapons, including
heavy weapons, investigators believed that Abdeslam's confession was
true and that the Paris attacker was indeed on the verge of undertaking a
terrorist operation in Brussels. Furthermore, they found a new network
around Abdeslam in Brussels.
This
information, revealed a few days prior to the Brussels attacks, evolved
from theory to reality as three explosions rocked the Belgian capital.
Given Abdeslam's revelations and police reports of a new jihadist cell
around him, it is more than likely that the Brussels explosions were
undertaken by this new cell centred on Abdeslam. During the week
preceding the attacks, the Belgian police managed to arrest and kill
some of those jihadists (in operations in Molenbeek and Forest).
Tragically, it wasn't enough.
This
ability to react with flexibility and ferocity in equal measure is a
signature of IS as a terrorist organisation. It has established sleeper
cells in foreign cities, which allows the group to activate and execute
attacks as deemed necessary by the central leadership.
The
sophistication and training of these sleeper cells often surpasses the
ability of western intelligence to find them or prevent attacks, as
evidenced by the twin Brussels blasts.
In
the wider picture, the Brussels attacks are not just about Abdelslam's
arrest, but also in response to the increased pressure on IS in its
strongholds in Syria and Iraq (where it governs significant amounts of
territory). The pressure comes primarily from aerial bombing raids, led
by Gulf and Western nations, and any nation involved – even tangentially
– is an obvious target.
Belgium, as a member of the US-led bombing
coalition and origin of a high number of foreign fighters that have
joined IS in Syria, was always at an even higher risk.
At the same time, IS hopes to divert attention away from from its struggles on the home front.
But
attacks on western cities are not just about retribution or
distraction.
They are also designed to send a message that IS is present
and active in these countries, and maintains the ability to perpetrate
violent acts at will – regardless of increased security measures.
More
important, they are hoping to divide western communities by inciting a
harsh security-led response from governments, and an anti-Muslim
backlash.
IS can exploit these tensions, both in its highly-developed
propaganda material and in its person-to-person recruitment operation.
The principle is that in the near to medium-term future,
IS will
continue with similar attacks: not only in Europe but in Africa too.
There
is little to suggest that the various government intelligence agencies
trying to prevent more attacks have the penetration necessary to prevent
such attacks. This is likely to be coupled with a propaganda campaign
depicting a Europe in crisis and Muslims under threat, with the Islamic
State's self-declared Caliphate as the only saviour.
This may in turn
inspire “lone wolf” attacks not directly managed or ordered by IS.
It
only takes a handful of individuals to execute attacks, and potential
targets such as airports and hotels are not subject to stringent
security measures.
So
is IS likely to target South Africa? That question misses the point. An
IS attack is the worst-case scenario, but the best counterterrorism
strategy is always to plan for the worst. Likely or not – and like it or
not – South Africa had better get planning.
Jasmine Opperman is the Africa Director for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.
