How Iran Went Nuclear and how far are they now?(
Matzav).By Dovid Feith
It has been more than three years since President Obama revealed the existence of the secret Iranian nuclear facility at Fordo-a uranium-enrichment plant buried deep inside a mountain and surrounded by missile silos and anti-aircraft batteries. Is the world due for another surprise soon?
If anyone has standing to speculate, it is Olli Heinonen, who says he first “got a whiff” of Fordo six years before Mr. Obama acknowledged it. In the fall of 2003, Mr. Heinonen was in his office at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna when a man appeared unannounced.
The “walk-in”-whom Mr. Heinonen hasn’t previously discussed, and whose nationality he won’t disclose-claimed that Iran was replicating its existing uranium-enrichment facility in an underground site near the holy city of Qum. And so it was, as the IAEA and Western spy agencies later confirmed.
But that isn’t all the walk-in shared in 2003. Also under construction in Iran, he said, was a duplicate of the Arak heavy-water facility designed to produce plutonium. In other words, the walk-in said that Iran had at least two secret sites, and he was correct on the first. What about the second-is there a plutonium facility that remains secret today?
“People talk a lot about how intelligence has penetrated all this,” he says of Iran’s weapons program, “
but if you go back to the nuclear programs which have been revealed [elsewhere], they all came with a surprise. If there is no undeclared installation today . . . it will be the first time in 20 years that Iran doesn’t have one.”
Even assuming that Iran’s regime has no secret facilities, it could go the North Korea route-defined by Mr. Heinonen as deciding “Enough is enough, to heck with this, we’ll build a nuclear weapon”-in “a month or two,” he says. The precise timing would depend on how (and how well) Iranian engineers go about enriching their uranium stocks to weapons-grade purity. But in any case, Mr. Heinonen notes, Iran’s breakout would likely outpace the ability of the “international community” to respond.
Mr. Heinonen cites a 2003 episode in which former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani helped convince the supreme leader to reverse his public position against signing an additional-protocol agreement with the IAEA.
Then again, as Mr. Heinonen confirms, Iran cheated on that agreement and terminated its implementation after two years, so it doesn’t inspire much confidence. If a grand-and honest-bargain can’t be struck, and Iran is recognized as a de facto or overt nuclear power, then what? Will the Middle East see a nuclear-arms race as rival nations try to catch up?
“Yes, it might, but not overnight,” Mr. Heinonen says. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others would need five to 10 years to build a bomb “even in a crash course.”
Yet that is only if the countries are “starting from zero,” he notes. Saudi Arabia may already be on the move.
In 2011, the kingdom announced plans to build 16 nuclear power reactors by 2030. “That’s actually a funny number,” Mr. Heinonen says-just what a country would need to justify developing domestic fuel-cycle capabilities that could have both civilian and military uses. “
If you want to maintain your own uranium enrichment, that’s the right number. . . . It’s a perfect match.” He adds: “Remember, there was no one military program which took place without civilian. It’s always under the civilian umbrella.”
For now, Mr. Heinonen is most concerned about Pakistan. The country is unstable, its nuclear arsenal huge, and “
they are building these tactical nuclear weapons, which means that they need to move them around. . . . So how do you maintain the control?”Read the full story
here.